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University of Oxford
Abstract. Static analysers search for overapproximating proofs of safety
commonly known as safety invariants. Fundamentally, such analysers
summarise traces into sets of states, thus trading the ability to distin-
guish traces for computational tractability. Conversely, static bug finders
(e.g. Bounded Model Checking) give evidence for the failure of an asser-
tion in the form of a counterexample, which can be inspected by the
user. However, static bug finders fail to scale when analysing programs
with bugs that require many iterations of a loop as the computational
effort grows exponentially with the depth of the bug. We propose a novel
approach for finding bugs, which delivers the performance of abstract in-
terpretation together with the concrete precision of BMC. To do this,
we introduce the concept of danger invariants – the dual to safety in-
variants. Danger invariants summarise sets of traces that are guaranteed
to reach an error state. This summarisation allows us to find deep bugs
without false alarms and without explicitly unwinding loops. We present
a second-order formulation of danger invariants and use the solver de-
scribed in [1] to compute danger invariants for intricate programs taken
from the literature.
Keywords: static bug finding, deep bugs, second-order logic, trace summarisation,
program synthesis.
1 Introduction
Safety analysers search for proofs of safety commonly known as safety invariants
by overapproximating the set of program states reached during all program exe-
cutions. Fundamentally, they summarise traces into abstract states, thus trading
the ability to distinguish traces for computational tractability [2]. Consequently,
safety analysers may generate bug reports that do not correspond to actual er-
rors in the code (i.e. false alarms). This is illustrated in Figure 1. False alarms
are the primary barrier to the adoption of static analysis technology outside
academia. Triage of true errors and false alarms is a tedious and difficult task,
and there are reports that developers fare no better than coin tossing [3].
Conversely, static bug finders such as Bounded Model Checking (BMC)
search for proofs that safety can be violated. Dually to safety proofs, we will call
these danger proofs. Static bug finders have the attractive property that once
an assertion fails, a counterexample trace is returned, which can be inspected
by the user [4]. The counterexample is thus the proof that an assertion viola-
tion occurs. In order to construct such a danger proof, bounded model checkers
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compute underapproximations of the reachable program states by progressively
unwinding the transition relation. The downside of this approach is that static
bug finders fail to scale when analysing programs with bugs that require many
iterations of a loop. For illustration, Figure 2 depicts the successive unwinding
of the transition relation, where progressively larger sets of reachable program
states are labelled with letters from A to F. The computational effort required
to discover an assertion violation (i.e. to obtain an intersection with the small
ellipse labelled “error states”) typically grows exponentially with the depth of
the bug.
Notably, the scalability problem is not limited to procedures that imple-
ment BMC. Approaches based on a combination of over- and underapproxima-
tions such as predicate abstraction [5] and lazy abstraction with interpolants
(LAwI) [6] are not optimised for finding deep bugs either. The reason for this is
that they can only detect counterexamples with deep loops after the repeated
refutation of increasingly longer spurious counterexamples. The analyser first
considers a potential error trace with one loop iteration, only to discover that
this trace is infeasible. Consequently, the analyser increases the search depth,
usually by considering one further loop iteration. This repeated unwinding suf-
fers from the same exponential blow-up as BMC.
Danger proofs. In this paper we propose a novel representation of a danger proof
based on trace summarisation. We propose to merge the two core concepts of
safety analysers based on abstract interpretation and bug finders: trace summari-
sation (for scalability purposes) and counterexample generation (for precision).
The intuition is that summarising traces is permissible as long as the summary
is guaranteed to contain at least one feasible counterexample trace (i.e. a trace
that starts in an initial state and reaches an error state).
The resulting summary is a dual of a safety invariant, which we refer to as
a danger invariant. As opposed to safety invariants, danger invariants do not
necessarily include all the reachable program states, but must contain at least
one feasible execution trace. A danger invariant may encompass multiple paths
through the program, but contains enough information to directly read off a
concrete error trace. The danger invariant therefore amounts to a concise proof
that such an error trace exists.
3From a practical point of view, danger invariants will allow the development
of bug finding techniques that do not require explicit loop unwinding. We empiri-
cally show that danger invariants improve the scalability of bug finding, enabling
the detection of deep bugs. From a theoretical point of view, we propose a dual
to over-approximating safety invariants, which are at the core of safety analysis.
Over-approximating invariants have received an enormous quantity of research
ever since the seminal work of Cousot and Cousot [2]. The equivalent of this
body of work for invariants biased towards bug finding is missing.
While the main technique that we use in this paper to compute danger in-
variants is based on program synthesis (Section 3.1), given that the trace sum-
marisation concept is common to both safety and danger invariants, we also
investigate how methods used for safety invariant generation can be adapted for
danger invariants (Section 5).
Contributions:
– To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first formulation of a
concise proof of the existence of an error trace that allows trace sum-
marisation without false alarms.
– We show that danger invariants improve the scalability of bug finding
by using the second-order solver in [1] to infer danger invariants for
programs with deep bugs.
– We investigate how techniques used for inferring safety invariants can
be adapted for danger invariants.
– We generate danger invariants for a set of benchmarks taken from the
literature.
2 From Counterexamples to Danger Invariants
We represent a program P as a transition system with state space X and tran-
sition relation T ⊆ X ×X . For a state x ∈ X with T (x, x′), x′ is said to be a
successor of x under T . We denote initial states by I and error states by E.
Definition 1 (Execution Trace). A program trace 〈x0 . . . xn〉 is a (potentially
infinite, in which case n = ω) sequence of states, such that any two successive
states are related by the program’s transition relation T , i.e.
∀0 ≤ i < n.T (xi, xi+1) .
Definition 2 (Counterexample). A finite execution trace 〈x0 . . . xn〉 is a coun-
terexample iff x0 is an initial state, x0 ∈ I, and xn is an error state, xn ∈ E.
A counterexample is an instance of a danger proof: it provides evidence that
an error state will be reached in some program execution. The question we try to
answer in this paper is whether we can derive a more compact representation of a
danger proof that does not require us to explicitly write down every intermediate
state. Similarly to safety invariants, we obtain such a compact representation by
4summarising traces. While this approach may involve overapproximation, the
tricky part is retaining enough precision to ensure that a counterexample trace
exists. In the rest of the section, we will explain our formulation by starting
from a safety invariant and progressively adjusting it to show the existence of a
counterexample. For this purpose, we will refer to loops of the form L(G, T, I, A)
shown in Figure 3, which we encode with predicates for the initial states: I(x),
guard: G(x), body: T (x, x′) and assertion: A(x).
assume (I ) ;
whi le (G) T ;
a s s e r t (A ) ;
Fig. 3: The general form of a loop
Safety Invariants. Intuitively, a safety invariant is a set of states S that includes
every state reachable via zero or more iterations of the loop, and which excludes
all error states. More formally:
Definition 3 (Safety Invariant). A predicate S is a safety invariant for the
loop L(I,G, T,A) iff it satisfies the following criteria:
∀x.I(x) → S(x) (1)
∀x, x′.S(x) ∧G(x) ∧ T (x, x′)→ S(x′) (2)
∀x.S(x) ∧ ¬G(x) → A(x) (3)
2.1 From Safety to Danger
It is well known that Definition 3 captures the notion of a safety invariant, and
that if a predicate S exists that satisfies these three criteria, then the loop L
is safe. We will now consider what the dual notion of a danger invariant might
look like, and identify the criteria defining it.
Let us begin by considering what happens if we take the natural step of
replacing criterion 3 with its complement: if we exit the loop in an S-state, we
would like the assertion to fail. This gives us the following definition:
Definition 4 (Doomed Loop Head). The head of the loop L(I,G, T,A) is a
doomed point [7] iff there exists a predicate S′ satisfying:
∀x.I(x)→ S′(x) (4)
∀x, x′.S′(x) ∧G(x) ∧ T (x, x′)→ S′(x′) (5)
∀x.S′(x) ∧ ¬G(x) → ¬A(x) (6)
5The term “doomed program point” was introduced in [7] and denotes a pro-
gram location that, whenever reached, will inevitably lead to an error regardless
of the state in which it is reached. Definition 4 applies this notion to the head
of the loop L: the predicate S′ provides proof that the head of the loop L is a
doomed point, so if such an S′ exists then the loop will certainly fail. However,
this definition is overly restrictive: in practice, for most unsafe programs such
an S′ does not exist.
For illustration, the program in Figure 4a is unsafe (any execution starting
with x > 10 will lead to the assertion failing) but since there are some initial
states that do not lead to an error (i.e. every state with x ≤ 10) there are no
doomed points. Thus, we weaken Definition 4 by introducing doomed program
states: we weaken criterion 1 to say that there must be some initial state leading
to an error rather than every initial state. This gives us the following:
Definition 5 (Doomed Program State). There is trace containing an error
state, starting from the head of the loop L(I,G, T,A) if a predicate S′′ exists
satisfying:
∃x0.I(x0)→ S
′′(x0) (7)
∀x, x′.S′′(x) ∧G(x) ∧ T (x, x′)→ S′′(x′) (8)
∀x.S′′(x) ∧ ¬G(x) → ¬A(x) (9)
x = ∗ ;
wh i l e (x < 10) {
x++;
}
a s s e r t (x == 10 ) ;
(a) An unsafe loop with
no doomed program
points.
x = 0 ;
whi l e (x < 10) {
i f (∗ ) break ;
x++;
}
a s s e r t ( x == 10 ) ;
(b) An unsafe loop with
no doomed states.
x = 0 ;
y = 0 ;
wh i l e (x < 10) {
y++;
}
a s s e r t (x < 1 0 ) ;
(c) A safe program with
no finite error traces.
Fig. 4: Illustrative programs – * means nondeterministic choice.
Definition 5 weakens the notion of a doomed location. Rather than requiring
every trace including the doomed location to reach an error, we only require that
there is some doomed initial state, i.e. every trace including that state will reach
an error. However, this is still too strong a condition! Figure 4b shows an unsafe
program which has no doomed states – every state in the loop has some successor
that leads to a state in which the assertion holds (i.e. every trace in which the
break is never executed). To work around this, we can weaken criterion 2 to say
that each state must have some successor leading to an error.
6Definition 6 (Partial Danger). There is a trace containing an error state,
starting from the head of the loop L(I,G, T,A) if a predicate S′′′ exists satisfying:
∃x0.I(x0)→ S
′′′(x0) (10)
∀x.S′′′(x) ∧G(x)→ ∃x′. ∧ T (x, x′) ∧ S′′′(x′) (11)
∀x.S′′′(x) ∧ ¬G(x) → ¬A(x) (12)
We are very nearly done: Definition 6 captures that there is some trace con-
taining an error state starting from some initial state. However, our definition of
an execution trace (Definition 1) includes infinite traces. Thus, the trace contain-
ing the error may be infinite and the error state will not be reachable at all. For
example, consider Figure 4c. A possible partial danger invariant is ‘true’, which
meets all of the criteria 10, 11 and 12. However, the program is in fact safe – it
contains no terminating traces and so the assertion is never even reached. Defi-
nition 6 captures partial danger, which disregards the termination behaviour of
the program. Instead, what we really want is total danger, which will guarantee
that there is some finite trace culminating in an error. To ensure that the error
traces are finite, we will introduce a ranking function, which will serve as a proof
of termination. Below we recall the definition of a ranking function:
Definition 7 (Ranking function). A function R : X → Y is a ranking func-
tion for the transition relation T if Y is a well-founded set with order > and R
is injective and monotonically decreasing with respect to T . That is to say:
∀x, x′ ∈ X.T (x, x′)⇒ R(x) > R(x′)
This is the final piece we need to define danger invariants:
Definition 8 (Danger Invariant). A pair 〈D,R〉 of a predicate and a rank-
ing function is a danger invariant for the loop L(I,G, T,A) iff it satisfies the
following criteria:
∃x0.I(x0) ∧D(x0) (13)
∀x.D(x) ∧G(x)→ R(x) > 0 ∧ ∃x′.T (x, x′) ∧D(x′) ∧R(x′) < R(x) (14)
∀x.D(x) ∧ ¬G(x)→ ¬A(x) (15)
Theorem 1 (Danger Invariants Prove Bugs). The loop L(I,G, T,A) is
unsafe iff there exists a danger invariant satisfying the criteria in Definition 8.
In other words, the existence of a danger invariant is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the reachability of a bug.
3 Second-Order Formulation of Danger Invariants
The problem of program verification can be reduced to the problem of finding
solutions to a second-order constraint [8, 9]. In order to give a second-order
formulation of a danger invariant, we will use a fragment of second-order logic
decidable over finite domains that we defined in [1], and to whose satisfiability
problem we refer as Second-Order SAT. Next, we recall this fragment:
7Definition 9 (Second-Order SAT).
∃S1 . . . Sm.Q1x1 . . .Qnxn.σ
Where the Si range over predicates, the Qi are either ∃ or ∀, xi range over
Boolean values and σ is a quantifier-free propositional formula that may refer to
both the first-order variables xi and the second-order variables Si.
Definition 10 (Danger Invariant Formula [DI]).
∃D,R, x0.∀x.∃x
′
.I(x0) ∧D(x0) ∧
D(x) ∧G(x)→ T (x, x′) ∧D(x′) ∧
R(x) > 0 ∧ R(x) > R(x′) ∧
D(x) ∧ ¬G(x)→ ¬A(x)
Definition 11 (Skolemized Danger Invariant Formula [SDI]).
∃D,R,N, x0.∀x.I(x0 ∧D(x0) ∧
D(x) ∧G(x)→ R(x) > 0 ∧ T (x,N(x)) ∧D(N(x)) ∧R(x) > R(N(x))
D(x) ∧ ¬G(x)→ ¬A(x)
Fig. 5: Existence of a danger invariant as second-order SAT
Our first second-order formulation of a danger invariant is captured in the
second-order SAT formula [DI] of Definition 10. In this definition, in order to
specify that from each D-state we can reach another by iterating the loop once,
we require quantifier alternation over the first order variables. However, the
solver from [1] that we want to use requires eliminating the extra level of quan-
tifier alternation (the inner existential quantifier) by using Skolem functions.
If the transition relation T is deterministic, then we do not need the quantifier
alternation, since each x has exactly one successor x′. Thus, we can just replace
the inner ∃x′ in the formula [DI] by ∀x′. However, if T is non-deterministic, we
must find a Skolem function N which resolves the non-determinism by telling
us exactly which successor is to be chosen on each iteration of the loop. This is
shown in the formula [SDI] of Definition 11.
3.1 Danger Invariants Generation
In this section, we discuss how to solve the constraints generated for danger
invariants. In [1], we show that Second-Order SAT is polynomial-time reducible
to finite synthesis, and finite-state program synthesis is NEXPTIME-complete.
8Next, we provide a short description of the program synthesis algorithm and, for
more details, we direct the reader to [1]. Our algorithm is sound and complete
for the finite-state synthesis decision problem. In the case that a specification
is satisfiable, our algorithm produces a minimal satisfying program. We use
Counterexample Guided Inductive Synthesis (CEGIS) [10, 11] to find a program
satisfying our specification.
synth verif Done
Candidate program
Counterexample input
Valid
Fig. 6: Abstract synthesis refinement loop
As illustrated in Figure 6, the algorithm is divided into two procedures:
synth and verif, which interact via a finite set of test vectors inputs. By
using explicit proof search, symbolic bounded model checking and genetic pro-
gramming with incremental evolution [12, 13], the synth procedure tries to find
an existential witness P that satisfies the partial specification:
∃P.∀x ∈ inputs.σ(x, P )
If synth succeeds in finding a witness P , this witness is a candidate solution
to the full synthesis formula. We pass this candidate solution to verif which
determines whether it does satisfy the specification on all inputs by checking
satisfiability of the verification formula:
∃x.¬σ(x, P )
If this formula is unsatisfiable, the candidate solution is in fact a solution to
the synthesis formula and so the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the witness x
is an input on which the candidate solution fails to meet the specification. This
witness x is added to the inputs set and the loop iterates again.
3.2 Generalised Safety-Danger Formula
The decision procedure introduced in [1] and briefly described above relies on
a small-model argument to determine that a formula is unsatisfiable and, in
practice, it is usually unable to prove unsatisfiability. Therefore we would like
to only provide satisfiable formulae whenever possible. Since the program we
are analysing is either safe or unsafe, and assuming that a proof is expressible
in our logic, a program either accepts a safety invariant or a danger invariant.
9We model this as a disjunction in the formula [GS] of Definition 12. [GS] is a
theorem of second-order logic, and our decision procedure will always be able
to find witnesses S,D,N,R, y0 demonstrating its truth, provided such a witness
is expressible in our logic. The synthesised predicate S is a purported safety
invariant and the D,N,R, y0 constitute a purported danger invariant. If S is
really a safety invariant, the program is safe, otherwise D,R (with witnesses to
the existence of an error trace with Skolem function N and initial state y0) will
be a danger invariant and the program is unsafe. Exactly one of these proofs will
be valid, i.e. either S will satisfy the criteria for a safety invariant, or D,N,R, y0
will satisfy the criteria for a danger invariant. We can simply check both cases
and discard whichever “proof” is incorrect.
Definition 12 (Generalised Safety Formula [GS]).
∃S,D,N,R, y0.∀x, x
′
, y.


I(x)→ S(x) ∧
S(x) ∧G(x) ∧ T (x, x′)→ S(x′) ∧
S(x) ∧ ¬G(x)→ A(x)

 ∨


I(y0) ∧D(y0) ∧
D(y) ∧G(y)→ R(y) > 0 ∧ T (y,N(y)) ∧D(N(y))
∧R(y) > R(N(y))∧
D(y) ∧ ¬G(y)→ ¬A(y)


Fig. 7: General second-order SAT formula characterising safety
4 Illustrative Examples
To illustrate the use of danger invariants for compactly representing danger
proofs and finding deep bugs, as well as the shortcomings of the existing bug
finding techniques, we consider the programs in Figure 8, where (a), (b), (c), (d)
contain deep bugs, whereas (e) models a buffer overflow.
For program (a), any execution trace violates the assertion unless the nonde-
terministic choice (denoted by “*”) is such that y is incremented exactly 999999
times out of the 1000000 iterations of the loop. In order to analyse this program
bounded model checkers have to completely unwind the loop. The resulting SAT
instance is very large, so large in fact that solving it will almost certainly take
far too long to be practical. Hybrid approaches such as predicate abstraction
and LAwI will have to progressively unwind the loop in order to refute spurious
counterexamples of increasing length. Again, this is most likely to take too long
to be practical.
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In our case, in order to prove that the assertion can be violated, we need to
find a danger invariant. This means that we need an approximation of the set
of states reachable during the program’s execution that must include a feasible
counterexample trace. Of course there may be several such invariants. One pos-
sibility for this example is D(x, y) = x < y and ranking function R(x, y) = −x.
D holds in the initial state where x = 0 and y = 1, and it is inductive with re-
spective to the loop’s body if the nondeterministic choice is given by the Skolem
function Ny(x, y) = y + 1. That is:
∀x, y, x′.x < y → x′ = x+ 1 ∧ x′ < Ny(x, y)
Program (b) is a version of (a) with additional nondeterminism. Now, in each
loop iteration, xmay or may not be incremented. This modification substantially
increases the number of reachable program states, as well as introducing a po-
tential non-terminating behaviour as x may not reach 1000000. As a result,
bounded model checkers will loop forever trying to generate the SAT instance
corresponding to the unwound loop. Similarly, predicate abstraction and LAwI
based approaches are even less likely to be practical than for version (a) of the
program due to the increase in the number of reachable states. We synthesise
the same D as for program (a) as it still contains a feasible counterexample trace
regardless of the additional nondeterminism. Here, termination depends on the
Skolem function giving us the successor of x. Thus, we can have R(x, y) = −x
and Nx(x, y) = x+ 1.
Program (c) is similar to (a), with the exception that the assertion is now
negated. This example is more intricate as the danger invariant needs to capture
the evolution of x and y from the the initial state where they are not equal to a
final state where there are (and hence they cause the assertion to fail). One such
invariant is D(x, y) = y == (x < 1?1 : x) and R(x, y) = −x. Essentially, this
invariant says that y must not be incremented for the first iteration of the loop
(until x reaches the value 1), and from that point, for the rest of the iterations,
y gets always incremented such that x == y. For this case, D is a compact and
elegant representation of exactly one feasible counterexample trace. The witness
Skolem function that we get is Ny(x, y) = (x < 1?y : y + 1).
Program (d) is taken from [14], and it is meant to illustrate the difficulty
faced by tools based on predicate abstraction and abstraction refinement with
deterministic loops with a fixed execution count as many iterations of the iter-
ative refinement algorithm correspond to spurious executions of the loop body.
The assertion fails, but proving this requires 1000000 iterations of the refine-
ment loop, resulting in the introduction of the predicates (i == 0),(i ==
1),...,(i == 1000000) one by one. For us, some of the possible danger invari-
ants are D(i, c, a) = a≤ − 10, D(i, c, a) = a == 0, D(i, c, a) = a≤0 and
R(i, c, a) = true.
Program (e) models a check for a buffer overflow. The buffer overflow does
happen whenever x is big enough such that the computation of x ∗ 4 overflows.
We find the danger invariant D(x, i, len) = (i == 0 ∧ len == 0 ∧ x 6= 0) and
ranking function R(x, i, len) = true. This basically says that the computation of
11
len overflowed resulting in len = 0 (while x 6= 0). Consequently, the loop is not
taken such that i stays 0 and the ranking function is true. Note that this example
has the assertion inside the loop, and required some trivial preprocessing in order
to move it outside the loop.
x = 0 ; y = 1 ;
whi le ( x < 1000000) {
x++;
i f (∗ ) y++;
}
a s s e r t ( x == y ) ;
(a)
x = 0 ; y = 1 ;
whi le ( x < 1000000) {
i f (∗ ) x++;
i f (∗ ) y++;
}
a s s e r t ( x == y ) ;
(b)
x = 0 ; y = 1 ;
whi le ( x < 1000000) {
x++;
i f (∗ ) y++;
}
a s s e r t ( x != y ) ;
(c)
void foo ( i n t a )
{
i n t i , c ;
i = 0 ;
c = 0 ;
whi le ( i < 1000000) {
c=c+i ;
i=i +1;
}
a s s e r t ( a > 0 ) ;
}
(d) Adapted from [14]
i n t main ( void ) {
unsigned in t x , i , l en ;
l en = x ∗ 4 ;
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < x ; i++) {
a s s e r t ( i ∗ 4 < l en )
}
}
(e) Checking for a buffer overflow caused
by an integer overflow.
Fig. 8: Motivational examples.
5 Danger Invariants in Relation to Other Formalisms
In this section, we relate danger invariants to other existing formalisms. For
this purpose, we start by providing a characterisation of danger invariants as a
fixed point computation. First, we define the set of program executions starting
in an initial state, Efwd , and the set of program executions ending in an error
12
state, Ebck. The set of program execution traces starting in an initial state (real
executions) is
Tfwd = {〈x0...xn〉 | ∀i. T (xi, xi+1) ∧ x0 ∈ I} = lfp(Ffwd )
where Ffwd constructs execution traces by taking a transition forward:
Ffwd = λS.{〈x〉 | x ∈ I} ∪ {〈x0...xn, xn+1〉 | 〈x0...xn〉 ∈ S ∧ T (xn, xn+1)}
The set of program execution traces ending in an error state is
Tbck = {〈x0...xn〉 | ∀i. T (xi, xi+1) ∧ xn ∈ E} = lfp(Fbck)
where Fbck constructs execution traces by taking a transition backward:
Fbck = λS.{〈x〉 | x ∈ E} ∪ {〈x−1, x0...xn〉 | 〈x0...xn〉 ∈ S ∧ T (x−1, x0)}
Similar to [15], we can now express the set of execution traces starting in an
initial state and ending in an error state as Err = lfp(Ffwd ) ∩ lfp(Fbck ). Then,
a danger invariant is an approximation of lfp(Ffwd ) (either D ⊇ lfp(Ffwd ) or
D ⊆ lfp(Ffwd )), such that it contains at least one error trace D ∩ Err 6= ∅.
5.1 Abstract Interpretation
Given that direct computation of the set of possible execution traces of a program
is most of the times infeasible, an abstract interpretation based analysis conser-
vatively computes at each program point a set of abstract states representing
an overapproximation of the possible concrete program states [2]. The analysis
assigns to each program location an abstract value from an abstract domain.
The concretisation mapping γ is defined such that for every program location l
produces an abstract state x#, such that γ(x#) contains all the concrete states
reachable at location l.
The abstract forward interpreter Ffwd
♯ is inherently overapproximating,
lfp(Ffwd ) ⊆ γ(lfp
♯(Ffwd
♯)). This means that, whenever an error is signalled at
program location l, the alarm may be spurious. In order to decide whether an
alarm is genuine, abstract interpretation based techniques require backward anal-
ysis starting from the error state. Various solutions have been already proposed
in the abstract interpretation literature [16, 17, 15]. Next, we see which of these
can be used to compute danger invariants.
For illustration purposes, we will use the program in Figure 9 (adapted from
[16]) as a running example throughout this section. The program takes an input
variable y bounded between 100 and 200 and iteratively decreases it by 2. The
program is erroneous as the assertion y == 0 is violated whenever the initial
value of y is odd. The abstract states x0
♯ to x4
♯ inferred by a forward analysis
based on the interval domain are listed next: x0
♯ = [100, 200], x1
♯ = [−1, 200],
x2
♯ = [1, 200], x3
♯ = [−1, 198], x4♯ = [−1, 0].
Since x4
♯ violates the assertion y == 0, in order to check whether it is
genuine, the negation of the assertion y<0∧y>0 must be propagated backwards.
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Given that the result of the forward analysis is a sound overapproximation, the
negation of the assertion can be intersected with x4
♯ resulting in y = −1, which
is then propagated backwards. If this propagation results in the set of states
being empty at any program location, then the error is a false alarm. Otherwise,
it is genuine. The main challenge is the presence of loops. Given a state after a
loop, it is non-trivial to infer a state that is valid prior to entering the loop. In
particular, it is necessary to assess how often the loop body needs to be executed
to reach the exit state.
In [16] Brauer and Simon use an overapproximating affine analysis to estimate
the number of loop iterations. Thus, they are able to obtain y = 2n−1∧n ∈ [1, 63]
at location l1 (corresponding to x1
♯ in the CFG). In order to obtain a danger
invariant from this, we just need to add the error state y = −1. Thus, we
obtain D(y) = (y == 2n− 1 ∧ n ∈ [0, 63]), which is is guaranteed to contain a
concrete counterexample. In [17], Erez performs a bounded search for backward
traces up to a given depth. For the given example, the first counterexample
found is: 〈y = −1, y = 1, ..., y = 101〉. Thus, a corresponding danger invariant is
D(y) = (y == −1∨y == 1∨...∨y == 101), orD(y) = (y == 2n−1∧n ∈ [0, 51]).
While the results of both these techniques can be immediately used to compute
danger invariants, this is not true for other works on eliminating false alarms in
abstract interpretation based techniques such as [15], where Rival computes an
overapproximation of Err by using in his backward analysis the same domains
as in forward analysis. Thus, the result is not a danger invariant and cannot
ensure the existence of a true error.
100 ≤ y ≤ 200
x
♯
0
x
♯
1
x
♯
2
x
♯
3
x
♯
4
assert(y == 0)
y > 0? y = y − 2
y≤0?
Fig. 9: The CFG of an erroneous program: the labels on the vertices denote the
corresponding abstract program states and the arcs correspond to instructions
in the program.
5.2 Bounded Model Checking
For a loop L(I,G, T,A), a bounded model checker progressively unwinds the
transition relation up to a depth k. As such:
T kfwd = lfp(F
k
fwd )
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where F kfwd constructs execution traces by taking a transition forward:
F kfwd = λS.{〈x〉 | x ∈ I} ∪ {〈x0...xn, xn+1〉 | 〈x0...xn〉 ∈ S ∧ T (xn, xn+1) ∧ n<k}
Thus, BMC finds counterexample traces of the form 〈x0, ..., xn〉, where x0 ∈
I, xn ∈ E and n≤k. Such a counterexample directly corresponds to the danger
invariant D(x) =
∨
i=0,n xi. For the running example, we have used CBMC [18]
and obtained the counterexample trace 〈y = 101, y = 99, ..., y = −1〉, which
corresponds to the danger invariant D(y) = (y == 101 ∨ y == 99 ∨ . . . ∨ y ==
−1).
5.3 Linear Invariants
There is a lot of work on the generation of linear invariants of the form c1x1 +
. . . + cndn + d ≤ 0 [19, 20]. The main idea behind these techniques is to treat
the coefficients c1, . . . , cn, d as unknowns and generate constraints on them such
that any solution corresponds to a safety invariant. In [20], Colon et al. present
a method based on Farkas’ Lemma, which synthesises linear invariants by ex-
tracting non-linear constraints on the coefficients of a target invariant from a
program. In a different work, Sharma and Aiken use randomised search to find
the coefficients [20]. It would be interesting to investigate how these methods
can be adapted for generating constraints on the coefficients c1, . . . , cn, d such
that solutions correspond to linear danger invariants.
6 Experimental Results
To evaluate our algorithm, we implemented the Dangerzone tool, which gen-
erates a danger specification from a C program and calls the second-order SAT
solver discussed in [1] to obtain a proof. We ran the resulting prover on 20 buggy
programs including the running examples in the paper, some examples from the
literature and some from SV-COMP’15 [21]. Our benchmarks do not make use
of arrays or recursion. We do not have arrays in our logic and we had not im-
plemented recursion in our frontend (although the latter can be syntactically
rewritten to our input format).
For each benchmark we infer a danger invariant, a ranking function, an initial
state and Skolem functions witnessing the nondeterminism. To provide a com-
parison point, we also ran CBMC [18] on the same benchmarks. For CBMC, we
manually provided sufficient unwinding limits for each program. Each tool was
given a time limit of 1800 s, and was run on an unloaded 4-core 3.30GHz i5-2500k
with 8GB of RAM. The results of these experiments are given in Figure 10.
On programs with shallow bugs (i.e. bugs that can be reached after a small
number of loop iterations), CBMC is much faster than Dangerzone. How-
ever, Dangerzone performs much better on programs with deep bugs provid-
ing empirical evidence that danger invariants improve the scalability of static
bug finding. We feel that the performance difference for shallow bugs is inherent
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to the difference in the two approaches – our solver is more general (and less
engineered) than CBMC, in that it provides a complete proof system for both
danger and safety. The two examples on which Dangerzone times out have an
intricate control flow structure which requires specific constants to be inferred in
the danger invariant – a case for which Dangerzone is not optimised. Notably,
only 6 of the benchmarks (marked with ∗ in the table) contain doomed loop
heads.
Benchmark Deep Bugs Shallow Bugs CBMC Dangerzone
loop1.c∗ X - 575 s 4.32 s
loop2.c X - TO 6.64 s
loop3.c [Fig 8c] X - TO 76.58 s
loop4.c [Fig 8e] - X 0.082 s 8.82 s
loop5.c [Fig 8d] X - TO 8.89 s
loop6.c [14] - X 0.084 s 6.51 s
loop7.c∗ X - TO 8.42 s
loop8.c∗ X - TO 5.09 s
loop9.c∗ X - TO 9.68 s
loop10.c X - TO 6.59 s
loop11.c [Fig 9] - X 0.171 s 5.54 s
loop12.c∗ - X 0.081 s 12.09 s
loop13.c - X 0.256 s 7.22 s
loop14.c - X 0.286 s TO
loop15.c - X 2.111 s TO
loop16.c∗ - X 0.081 s 8.20 s
loop17.c [Fig 8a] X - TO 6.30 s
loop18.c X - TO 8.59 s
loop19.c [Fig 8b] X - TO 7.40 s
loop20.c [Fig 4a] - X 0.082 s 6.97 s
Key: TO = time-out
Fig. 10: Experimental results
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the concept of danger invariants – the dual to safety
invariants. Danger invariants summarise sets of traces that are guaranteed to
reach an error state. This summarisation allows us to find deep bugs without
false alarms and without explicitly unwinding loops. This new concept promises
to deliver the performance of abstract interpretation together with the concrete
precision of BMC. We presented a second-order formulation of danger invariants
and used the solver described in [1] to compute danger invariants for a set of
benchmarks.
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